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THROUGH A GLASS, DARKLY 
clar•i•ty '\ 'klar- t-e '\ n [ME clarite, fr. L claritat-claritas, fr. clarus]: the quality 
or state of being clear. 
In New York Times v. Sullivan,' the U.S. Supreme Court set 
forth the standard of proof required of a public official in a defama-
tion action. Actual malice, the Court stated, must be demonstrated 
with "convincing clarity." Ten years later, in Gertz v. Robert 
Welch, Inc. ,z the Court described the same standard, but with 
slightly different terminology-recovery by a public official would 
be permitted only on a showing of "clear and convincing proof" of 
malice. 
During the past dozen years many courts-state and federal-
have applied the New York Times and Gertz standard (some even 
noting that "clear and convincing" and "convincing clarity" are es-
sentially interchangeable terms), but two courts-the Vermont and 
Hawaii Supreme Courts-have synthesized the variant descriptions 
into a remarkably redundant hybrid. Actual malice, both courts 
have declared, must be proved with "clear and convincing clarity."3 
Again during the last term the Supreme Court reviewed the 
Times/Gertz standard. In Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,4 it indi-
cated that "clear and convincing" and "convincing clarity" were 
one and the same. And once again another court took the next step. 
Recently, in Ashby v. Hustler Magazine, Inc. ,s a federal appel-
late court confronted the "actual malice" standard and revived the 
Vermont/Hawaii synthesis. Judge Krupansky cited Anderson v. 
Liberty Lobby for the principle that "the trial court must determine 
if the plaintiff has produced sufficient evidence from which a reason-
able jury could find that the plaintiff had demonstrated actual mal-
ice with clear and convincing clarity." 
By now it should be clearly and unambiguously clear: proof of 
malice with muddy, murky or turbid clarity is insufficient. There-
I. 376 u.s. 254, 280, 285-86 (1964). 
2. 418 U.S. 323, 342 (1974). 
3. Burns v. Times Argus Ass'n, Inc., 139 Vt. 381, 388, 430 A.2d 773, 777 (1981); Fong 
v. Merena, 66 Hawaii 72, 74, 655 P.2d 875, 876 (1982). 
4. 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2512 (1986). 
5. 802 F.2d 856, 860 (6th Cir. 1986). 
5 
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quirement of proof by "clear clarity" is-according to the Sixth Cir-
cuit-the law of the land. 
Thomas A. Woxland6 
6. Assistant Director, University of Minnesota Law Library. 
